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Abstract 
Deregulation of financial markets has been an important platform for 
government policy in recent times. It has been a catalyst in the expansion of 
financial sector. The experience of Australian life insurers during this 
period represents an interesting case study into the impact of regulatory 
transition. The lifting of restrictions changed the institutional environment 
within which life insurers operated. In doing so it precipitated changes in 
strategies and organiZational structures of these financial intermediaries. An 
information cost framework is used to analyse the consequences of 
deregulation and its implications for the Australian life insurance industry 
in emerging global financial markets. 
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Introduction 
In the last two decades the Australian financial system moved rapidly from 
one of the most regulated systems to one of the least in the space of a few 
years. The extent and speed of this change has had far reaching implications 
for the financial sector and the players within it. The adjustment experience 
provides an interesting case study into the impact of regulatory processes, 
particularly on specific sectors of the financial system. The Australian life 
insurance industry is a case in point. Mutual firms had been leaders in this 
market for well over a century. This form of organization was placed under 
pressure by the progressive deregulation of the banking sector that occurred 
in the 1980s and 1990s. The lifting of these restrictions changed the 
institutional environment within which life insurers operated. In doing so it 
precipitated changes in strategies and organisational structures of these 
financial intermediaries. Deregulation led to the emergence of new 
institutions that came into direct competition with established life insurers 
and challenged the status quo. 
It is the purpose of this paper to analyse the consequences of the 
financial deregulation and the restructuring it engendered for Australia's 
mutual life insurers in the 1990s and to investigate the process of 
organisational change which resulted. It is argued that a spillover effect of 
the regulatory system imposed on Australian banks after world war two was 
to protect the structure of the life insurance industry from the full force of 
developing market pressures. These forces, which were largely 
technologically driven, were a key element in motivating the push for 
financial sector restructuring. The lifting of regulatory controls removed the 
obstacles to market adjustment resulting in radical change in the structure of 
the Australian life insurance industry. The Australian experience reflects 
that of other countries, such a Britain where mutual financial firms played 
an important role in the development of the building society industry. As in 
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Britain, a change in the regulatory environment was a key catalyst to the 
demutualisation of these institutions which sparked further readjustments in 
the financial services sector (Martin and Turner, 2000). 
In developing the central argument, this paper will proceed by 
outlining a theoretical framework for evaluating the process of change in 
the life insurance industry. The structure of the industry as it evolved will 
be reviewed and the impact of changes in the regulatory environment 
assessed. 
Theoretical Explanations 
Chandler (1992) suggests that strategic plans, internal organization 
and lines of communication work together to shape corporate capabilities. 
The outcome determines the types of opportunities the firm can utilise 
within its environmental context. In this model firms are shaped by, and 
shape their environment (Boyce and Ville, 2002, p.20). Chandler's model 
provides an explanation of how firms grow and diversify leading to 
increasing productivity and growth in the economy. 
Alternatively pressures on organisational structures to change may 
be explained with reference to transaction costs. The problems of 
information asymmetry and bounded rationality contribute to the cost of 
transacting. Without access to all information, economic agents cannot 
make informed decisions about all aspects of the transaction. Firms and 
market structures that can create effective transacting frameworks will be 
more efficient than those that cannot (Boyce and Ville, 2002, p. 19). A 
variation of this argument is to extend the definition of transaction costs to 
include the costs of collecting and processing information necessary for the 
firm to conduct its business (Casson, 1997, p. 151). As these change, 
pressure is brought to bear on financial intermediaries to adapt. 
Organisational renewal is seen as a regular process within this model. The 
framew.ork suggests that changes in organisational structures are driven by 
changes in the processes of intermediation. These in tum are a response to 
changes in information costs (Casson 1997, p. 151-53). Two important 
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influences on information costs are technological change and regulation. 
Whilst technological developments ultimately reduce information costs, 
regulation tends to impede the flow of information and raise costs in this 
model. The lifting of controls, in freeing up the market mechanism alters 
the nature of information costs. The new and different competitive 
influences that arise put pressure on the organisational structure of firms 
and markets. The lifting of regulatory controls at a time of rapid 
technological innovation will create an environment in which organisational 
change becomes inevitable. The demutualisation of major life insurers in 
the 1990s is an illustration of this. 
Ownership structures in the life insurance industry within a 
regulated financial market 
Providers of life insurance in Australia have historically fallen into 
three categories, mutual associations, publicly listed companies and 
government agencies. Of the three groups, it has been the mutual 
associations which have historically held the largest percentage of industry 
assets. I Although there were several publicly listed companies operating in 
the market prior to world war two, it was not until the post war period that 
these firms made an impression on market share. The government sector 
entered the market even more recently. In the 1980s government insurers, 
spurred on by the expansion of superannuation, branched into life insurance 
in a limited way. From the mid 1980s four State insurance offices offered 
life insurance products. However they were constrained to operate within 
their particular state and unable to expand beyond it unless application was 
made for registration under the federal government life insurance act. 2 
The significance of mutual associations is a feature of the of the 
Australian life insurance industry which distinguishes it from experiences in 
other countries. In Britain, major life insurers evolved as departments of 
composite insurance companies selling a range of insurance products 
(Supple, 1971, p.74). In the USA, major life insurers converted to mutuals 
in.the early part of the twentieth century in response to public pressure to 
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curb the perceived corporate excesses of these large firms (Keller, 1963). 
The leading Australian life insurers however, were established as mutuals . 
and traced their foundations to co-operative values that had more in 
common with friendly societies than commercial insurers. The basis on 
which early mutual life offices operated was very different to that of private 
insurers. Mutual life offices were established as societies representing 
groups of concerned citizens with a common affiliation, be it religious or 
philanthropic and this influenced their approach to business and corporate 
development. 
The first mutual life insurance association was the Australian Mutual 
Provident (AMP) formed in 1849. The aim of the Society was to set up a 
'modest life office' for the benefit of clergymen and other professionals to 
provide for their old age and dependents (Blainey, 1999). The AMP 
remained the only Australian mutual society for twenty years. The second 
mutual life association was not formed until 1869 by which time the AMP 
had established its market dominance in the life insurance industry. What 
competition the AMP experienced between 1849 and 1869 came from the 
limited number of Australian proprietary and overseas general insurance 
companies in operation in the colonies. Four Australian companies 
established in the late 1850's and early 1860's sold life insurance as part of 
their general business. However all these companies had ceased to do so by 
1889. These companies found that life insurance was not a profitable branch 
of business Of the overseas companies, eighteen British firms had agents 
who sold life insurance in Australia between 1860 and 1869. This number 
had been reduced by half in 1880 and by 1893 there were no British 
companies selling life insurance in Australia (Gray, 1977, p. 22-3). 
By 1900 dominance of mutual life insurers was clearly established. 
Although they were only a small number they accounted for a substantial 
share of assets and premiums sold. Mutual associations captured and 
retained a large market share from a very early stage in the development of 
the industry. Table 1 demonstrates this point. 
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Table 1: The Historical Distribution of Assets between Mutual and 
Non Mutual Life Insurers, 1900-2000. 
Mutual Finns Non Mutuals 
Number % of Total Assets Number % of Total Assets 
1900 5 86 6 14 
1920 5 85 11 15 
1940 5 83 13 17 
1960 5 80 14 20 
1980 4 69 43 31 
1990 4 72 57 18 
1995 3 54 45 46 
2000 0 0 42 100 
Source: Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, 1900-60, Life Insurance Commission, 1980 
APRA,2000 
This table highlights a number of features of the Australian life insurance 
market. The number of life insurers in the market was historically very 
small and it was not until the 1970s that any significant increase occurred. 
In addition a small number of mutual offices traditionally accounted for 
around four fifths of industry assets although this began to fall in the 1980s. 
These firms were the market leaders for a significant period of time. The 
decade of the 1990s was a period of substantial organisational adjustment 
which saw a reversal of patterns in ownership structures with the 
disappearance of mutual life offices by the tum of the century. 
One explanation for the formation of the mutual form of 
organization was that it was the one that dealt with the information cost 
problem most effectively. It has been argued that the mutual governance 
system reduced some of the negative impact associated with information 
costs because it was better equipped to deal with the agency relationship 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 347). The policy holder in taking out an 
insurance contract delegated some decision making authority to the 
insurance company. A residual loss occurred if decisions made by the agent 
deviated from those which m~y have been made by the individual or 
principa1. Mutuals, in which policy holders also have rights of ownership, 
could be argued to be better placed to solve this type of agency problem. 
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Smith (1986, p. 708) argues that the long term survival of mutuals in 
competition with other ownership structures is indicative of the efficiency 
of this governance structure. Empirical studies of American companies 
which have switched from stock to mutual ownership support this 
conclusion (Mayers and Smith, 1986, p.74). McNamara and Rhee (1992, 
p.222) cite a number of studies which suggest that the mutual organisation 
is not necessarily inefficient. Efficiency gains may also accrue because of 
the absence of a third party (the shareholder) in the ownership structure. In 
a mutual association the policyholder is also an owner of the company's 
assets. The potential for policy holder/shareholder conflicts to occur are 
non-existent (Smith, 1986, p. 707-8). Gains in this respect may be countered 
by losses accruing from owner/manager conflicts. However Smith (1986) 
argues that mutuals have a definite comparative advantage in areas that 
require little managerial discretion. Life insurance policies based on 
predetermined formulae built on actuarial data fall into this category. 
However opinion is divided upon which form of ownership 
performs better. On the negative side, mutuals have been found to have 
number of features which could contribute to inefficiencies. Frech (cited in 
Mayers and Smith, 1986, p.74) argues that the actual property rights 
structure of mutuals indicates that policy holders may not have full property 
rights. For example, policyholders may participate in the returns of the 
mutuals assets but they cannot transfer ownership of these assets 
independently. 
Without full property rights mutuals may perform less efficiently 
than stock companies. The potential for owner/manager conflict is an 
example of this. In a stock insurance company the behaviour of 
management can be tempered by outside market forces. The threat of 
takeover can reduce the costs management can impose on other 
stakeholders of the firm. Competitive forces limit the extent to which 
management can take unilateral decisions which impact adversely on 
shareholders. The control mechanism which restricts the level of such 
conflict in stock firms is absent in the mutual which is not subject to the 
8 
same degree of market constraint. The removal of management is more 
difficult and costly in a mutual (Mayers and Smith, 1986, p.76). 
The long term success of mutual life insurers in Australia would 
suggest that these negative factors were not significant and that there was a 
high degree of efficiency in this method of ownership. In the life insurance 
market where mutual firms operate in direct competition with stock 
companies competitive pressures would ensure that unprofitable and 
inefficient structures of ownership did not survive in the long run. The fact 
that the major mutuals were also consistently among the market leaders 
would also suggest that this form of organisation was an efficient method of 
delivering life insurance products. 3 
The implications of deregulation for the life insurance sector 
A feature of the Australian financial sector in the post war era was 
the prescriptive and very rigid controls placed on the banking industry. For 
35 years the banking sector was one of the most highly regulated in the 
Western world. Whilst life insurers were not the direct target of these 
controls, they were nonetheless affected by them. Controls placed on 
Australian banks during the second world war were extended in the post 
war period to facilitate the implementation of the government's 
macroeconomic policy agenda. Direct control of banking was the main 
monetary policy tool used to moderate fluctuations in trade cycle (Merrett, 
2002, p. 277). However regulation also had far reaching implications for the 
development of the finance sector and the behaviour of financial entities. It 
defined the boundaries within which financial sector firms could operate 
and in doing so perpetuated market segmentation. The result of this 
segmentation was that banks and other large financial institutions could not 
compete directly in the life insurance market. They were forced to do so 
indirectly through the use of subsidiary -companies which had to be 
accredited with a license to sell life insurance. This meant that banks were 
not able to make full use of their information network and thus had _higher 
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information costs than if they had been able to compete directly. Likewise it 
also meant that life insurers were not able to compete directly in other parts 
of the financial sector. They too, had to do so indirectly through subsidiary 
companies (Keneley, 2004). Under this type of regime, protected by their 
historical position and the regulatory environment, the organisational 
structure of mutual life offices was not greatly challenged. 
The environment within which life insurance firms operated was 
altered with the progressive lifting of regulatory controls in the financial 
sector which began in the mid 1980s. The catalyst for this shift was the 
growing lack of competitiveness of banks both domestically and abroad as 
other financial institutions grew to provide the services banks were barred 
from. The process of disintermediation which had gathered strength in the 
preceding decades was also seriously impacting on the Australian 
government's ability to implement an effective monetary policy regime. 
The course of deregulation, inspired by the recommendation of the 
Committee ofInquiry into the Financial System (1981), was cumulative and 
an ongoing feature of the sector for most of the 1980s and 1990s. During 
this time interest rate and exchange rate controls were lifted, restrictions on 
the commercial activities of banks abolished and 'captive' market 
requirements on banks and life insurers removed (Davis, 1997, p. 4). 
Deregulation had far reaching implications for the structure and conduct of 
financial markets in Australia. With this opening up of the sector, barriers to 
entry and the segmentation of markets were reduced. The industry 
reorganisation which resulted from the lifting of restrictions led to the 
emergence of new institutions which no longer focused on the provision of 
one bundle of products. The growth of financial conglomerates which 
encompassed a range of activities was a feature of the Australian finance 
market in the 1990's (Davis, 1997, p. 12). 
Within the life insurance market, deregulation was associated with a 
shake up of the industry. The number of insurers initially increased from 45 
in 1980 to 58 in 1990. The reduction in barriers to entry allowed institutions 
to enter the market and compete directly with established firms. Banks, 
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which had previously only been able to compete indirectly in the life 
insurance market, rapidly gained market share from the mid 1980s. The first 
bank to register as a life insurer was the National Australia Bank in 1985. 
Over the next three to four years the other major banks followed suit. In 
1990 they accounted for 9 per cent of industry assets, a decade later this had 
risen to 44 per cent (ISC, 1990, APRA, 2000). 
The market trend both in Australia and overseas was for financial 
firms to become larger, spreading into other financial markets in a bid to 
exploit opportunities for related diversification and improve their 
competitive advantage. Realignment in the financial sector in the 1990s was 
associated with the rise of conglomerates. The Reserve Bank (1996, p.3) 
reported that by 1996 conglomerates accounted for around 80 per cent of 
financial system assets. The largest 25 held close to 70 per cent of assets. 
The Australian experience was part of a global trend whereby financial 
enterprises sought economies of scope in the sale of new financial products 
(De Souza, 1995, p. 21) 
In line with financial sector trends major life insurers also embarked 
on the process of expansion and diversification. Taking advantage of the 
relaxation in entry requirements the large life offices sought to enter the 
banking sector. The Colonial Mutual acquired the State Bank of New South 
Wales to form the Colonial Bank.4 The AMP attempted to negotiate a joint 
venture with the Chase Manhattan Bank (Blainey, 1999, pp. 288-9). In the 
decade of the 1990's the leading life insurance firms moved into the areas of 
integrated financial services. Firms such as the AMP, National Mutual and 
Colonial reorganized to become institutions that offered a full range of 
financial services from banking to insurance and financial planning. This 
was achieved through a series of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers that 
witnessed a restructure of the industry. 
The growth of mega institutions in the life insurance industry placed 
pressure on the mutual form of organization. The process has been part of an 
ongoing global trend to demutualisation that has been evident since the 
1980's (Garber, 1986).5 Demutualisation of insurance offices, building 
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societies and other thrift institutions occurred in Britain, Canada, South 
Africa and the USA (RBA, 1999, pp. 2-3). The Canadian experience in the 
1990's for example, was very similar to that in Australia with the public 
listing of four of the largest life insurance mutuals (Anon, 1999). In Britain, 
alteration to the regulation of building societies with the Building Societies 
Act 1986 paved the way for the demutualisation of larger building societies 
in the 1990s (Martin and Turner, 2000, pp. 225-7). 
Alongside the impact of financial deregulation, technological 
development in the production and distribution of financial services 
impacted on the traditional providers of life insurance. New technology 
altered the way in which services could be provided to consumers. This in 
tum allowed financial institutions to differentiate between the products they 
provided and their various customer groups (Llewellyn, 1996, p.168). The 
deconstruction of services into component parts opened the way for firms to 
focus on the provision of services for which they had a comparative 
advantage in (Llewellyn, 1996, p.157). The unbundling of insurance 
products, a trend that began in the 1970s, gained pace in the 1980s. The 
separation of life insurance products into mortality risk and investment 
earnings led to the creation of a whole range of investment linked products. 
This led the industry to become more closely linked with the financial 
services market than previously (ISC, 1990). Not only were life insurers 
offering similar products to other types of financial institutions, these firms 
also began providing substitutes for life insurance. New technology and 
new marketing techniques also meant that life insurers were required to 
invest and adapt to maintain market share. 
The unprecedented requirement for capital to support the 
transformation of life insurance associations into providers of integrated 
financial services to global markets was a critical factor in the push for 
demutualisation. The lifting of regulatory controls cleared the way for the 
growth of rpega financial institutions and called into question the essence of 
mutual ownership structures. Mutuality had evolved as a response to market 
failure. Both buyers and sellers faced particular informational problems in 
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distinguishing and defining risks associated with life insurance products 
(Hansmann, 1985). The mutual form of organization was able initially to 
minimise many of adverse consequences associated with asymmetric 
information. A century later the development of actuarial and insurance 
practice had overcome many of these problems. In the words of the 
chairman of one major mutual insurer the mutual organization had become 
'irrelevant and inappropriate' (Colonial Annual Report, 1998). 
Demutualisation became inevitable as the financial sector adjusted 
to the combined changes in the regulatory environment and technological 
advances in product and distribution systems. These factors and the 
accompanying globalisation of financial markets made old business 
structures obsolete. To compete with new forms of intermediation emerging 
in financial markets organizational change was needed. The listing of the 
major mutual life insurers as private companies occurred progressively 
throughout the 1990s as Table 2 indicates, 
Table 2: Life Insurance Demutualisation in the 1990s 
Life Insurer Date of Institution Form of 
Demutualisation Established Demutualisation 
City Mutual October 1990 MLCLife Acquisition by 
another insurer 
. National Mutual September 1996 National Mutual Share issue to 
Life Association of Holdings members and sale to 
Australasia foreign interests 
Colonial Mutual December 1996 Colonial Ltd. Share issue to 
Life Association members 
Australian Mutual January 1998 AMP Ltd. Share issue to 
Provident Society members 
Source: RBA 1999 
By 2000 there were no mutual providers of life insurance. The mutual 
system of life insurance which had dominated the Australian market for 150 
years had ceased to exist. The organisational approach adopted by the 
mutual life insurers was that of the multi subsidiary company model. Firms 
such as the Australian Mutual Provident Ltd, National Mutual Life Ltd and 
the Colonial Ltd. evolved to become 'allfinanz' institutions offering a full 
range of financial services from banking to insurance and wealth 
management to customers. Figure 1 synthesises the corporate model which 
evolved amongst the major life insurers. 
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Figure 1 The Corporate Model of Major Australian Life Insurers 
Principal operating or holding company 
Financial 
Services 
Supera nnuation 
Retirement 
Ineo me 
Ri sk Insur ance 
Gener aI 
Insur ane e 
Banking 
Funds 
Management: 
Property 
Private Capital 
With demutualisation the newly formed companies moved rapidly to 
become integrated service providers. Various activities which had been 
undertaken by subsidiaries in the past were brought under the umbrella of 
the principal company. New activities such as banking and stockbroking 
were initiated as these firms moved to establish themselves as major players 
within the financial sector. This in itself created pressures for further 
organisational change as the costs associated with entering new markets 
rose. 
Initial data available on the performance of demutualised life 
insurers indicated that a period of instability followed the transition process 
with the major firms experiencing fluctuations in profitability and efficiency 
measures. Whilst financial markets expected the major mutual life insurers 
to continue to be market leaders this was not necessarily the case (AFR, 4 
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Octo.ber 1997, pp.35-6; BRW 26 January 1990, pp.30-33). Measures used 
to. analyse the perfo.rmance o.f life insurers include changes in market size 
and share, pro.fitability and efficiency These measures are based en similar 
yardsticks used by Ho.gan (1991) and KPMG (1997) to. evaluate the 
perfo.rmance o.f ether financial institutio.ns. They are derived fro.m data 
co.llected by Australian Prudential Regulatio.n Autho.rity (APRA) in 
acco.rdance with the Life Insurance Act 1995. 6 
Table 3 indicates the trend in the size and market share o.f the majo.r 
life insurers that demutualised in the 1990's. The fermer mutuals still 
acco.unted fer mere than half industry assets. 
Table 3: Market Size and Market Share in the Life Insurance Industry 
Demutualised 
Finns 
Financial Year Total Assets $m Percentage 
Change 
1997/98 94,687 
-9 
1998/99 86,152 
21.4 
1999/00 104,597 
Non-Mutuals 
1997/98 75,364 
7.38 
1998/99 80,934 
11.4 
1999/00 90,171 
Source: calculated from APRA, 1998,1999,2000 
Percentage of Percentage of 
Industry Assets Premium 
Income 
55.6 40.2 
51.5 40.1 
53.7 37.0 
44.4 59.8 
48.5 59.9 
46.3 63 
Ho.wever, the gro.wth in the assets o.f demutualised firms varied 
co.nsiderably in co.mpariso.n to. the no.n mutuals. Fro.m experiencing negative 
gro.wth between 1998 and 1999 the trend reversed to. a rapid po.sitive gro.wth 
in 1999/2000. The perfo.rmance o.f certain firms highlight the extent o.f 
destabilisatio.n they underwent pest demutualisatio.n. After demutualisatio.n 
the two. largest firms, the AMP and Natio.nal Mutual Life, experienced a fall 
in the value o.f their assets during 1998-99. The value o.f these firm's assets 
fell by 15.2 per cent and 8.2 percent respectively (APRA 1999). This was 
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also reflected in the declining share of premium income attributed to the ex 
mutuals. 
The mixed performance of demutualised firms was mirrored in their 
profit outcomes. Profitability measures include operating profit before and 
after tax and as a proportion of net assets. They can be broken down to 
reflect the two main sources of the firm's income; premium income and 
investment income. 
Table 4: Profitability Measures 
Demutualised Firms 
Operating Profit Operating Profit Net Interest Premium AfterTax 
Before tax $m AfterTax $m IncomelTotal Incomel Total Operating Profitl 
Assets % Assets % Net Assets % 
1997198 4,135 2,605 11.0 13.2 21.6 
1998/99 2,257 1,762 8.4 17.0 28.6 
1999/00 544 215 7.5 11.9 2.7 
Non Mutuals 
1997/98 2,275 1,385 13.8 24.6 25.4 
1998/99 1,865 1,232 7.1 27 23.4 
1999/00 2,557 1,913 7.8 23 
Source: calculated from APRA 1998,1999,2000. 
Table 4 highlights the contrast between the performance of the 
demutualised firms and non mutuals. Whilst both experienced declining 
profits, for the non mutuals this was relatively short term and a strong 
recovery was evident within the next financial year. For demutualised firms 
recovery was not evident with both before and after tax profit declining by 
over 90 per cent between 1997 and 2000. In the same period the profitability 
of non mutuals grew 38 per cent before tax and 24 per cent after tax. 
The fall in the profitability is reflected in the ratio of operating profit 
to net assets. Here the volatility in the performance of the demutualised 
firms is also evident. After increasing sharply, the ratio fell dramatically 
largely because of the negative operating profit recorded by a major life 
msurer. 
Table 4 indicates that the profitability record of demutualised firms 
was erratic after the change in ownership structure. Table 5 suggests that 
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there were no great efficiency gains in this time frame. In Table 5 efficiency 
is measured in three ways, operating expenses as a proportion of total assets, 
percentage of operating expenses to operating income and operating profit 
as a ratio of operating expenses. 
Table 5: Efficiency 
Demutualised Finns 
Operating Expenses/ Operating Expenses / Operating Profit! 
Total Assets Operating Income % Operating Expenses 
1997/98 2.03 8.3 1.36 
1998/99 2.07 8.1 0.99 
1999/00 2.04 10.5 0.1 
Non Mutuals 
1997/98 2.22 6.4 0.83 
1998/99 2.28 6.6 0.67 
1999/00 2.3\ 7.4 0.92 
Source: calculated from APRA 1998,1999,2000. 
This table indicates that whilst the ratio of operating expenses to assets was 
marginally lower amongst demutualised firms, the proportion of operating 
expenses to income was much higher. The poor performance of the 
operating profit to expenses ratio is a common feature of all firms in the 
industry. It suggests that there was no immediate decrease in information 
costs following the change in organisational structure. The findings are 
consistent with those made by Yates (2005, pp.621-2). Yates, in 
investigating the impact of technological change in the American life 
insurance industry, found that there was a considerable lag (in some cases 
up to two decades) between the introduction of computerised technologies 
and efficiency gains. One reason for this was that organisational changes 
were needed to realise productivity gains. A similar argument could be 
made in respect to demutualised life insurers, further changes to operational 
structures were needed before any efficiency gains associated with 
demutualisation could be fully realised. 
Table 5 indicates that the returns to owners in re~ect to outlays were weak. 
This is a reflection of an industry in transition. The transformation of firms 
from in.surance companies to financial 90nglomerates put pressure .on 
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returns at a time when industry profits were squeezed. This can be seen in a 
breakdown of available data for the three major demutualised life insurers. 
Table 6: Return on Equity and Return on Assets for former Mutual Life 
Insurers 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ROE % 
AMP 12.53 6.37 6.87 7.04 3.55 
National Mutual 4.2 5.69 9.78 -22.52 11.54 
Colonial Mutual 10.6 7.93 9.29 Delisted 
ROA% 
AMP 13.32 1.17 1.02 1.03 0.72 
National Mutual 4.81 4.72 1.55 -1.44 1.79 
Colonial Mutual 2.49 1.81 2.03 
Source: AspectHuntley FinAnalysis 
The pattern of instability both in returns on equity and returns on assets is 
evident in all the major demutualised life insurers. One reason for the erratic 
performance of demutualised insurers was that the process of organizational 
change did not halt with demutualisation. Further adjustments continued as 
financial markets developed strategies to enable them to compete in an 
increasingly broader range of markets. The pressures within the financial 
sector towards conglomeration gathered momentum in the late 1990s, 
demutualised insurers were susceptible to these forces. 
In the immediate period after demutualisation, life insurers 
aggressively pursued expansionary strategies and moved to acquire market 
share in related markets. All acquired interests in banking and expanded 
their operations in general insurance and funds management both 
domestically and overseas. Appendix 1 provides a snapshot of the types of 
activities these firms undertook in the immediate period after 
demutualisation. The extent and pace of expansion is a reflection of the 
transitional state of the Australian financial sector. Whilst these firms 
expanded into other markets, competition from other financial service 
providers increased in the life insurance market. The degree of restructuring 
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saw the ex mutuals broaden their organizational base to become 
international players in the financial sector. However it also made them 
vulnerable to take over pressures from other larger firms. These pressures 
culminated in another round of adjustments at the end of the decade of the 
1990s. Table 7 traces the outcome of these changes that saw most of the 
demutualised life insurers disappear from the insurance market. 
Table 7: The progress of demutalised life insurers 
Life Insurer Date of 
Demutualisation 
City Mutual October 1990 
National Mutual September 1996 
Life Association of 
Australasia 
Colonial Mutual December 1996 
Life Association 
Australian Mutual January 1998 
Provident Society 
Institution Merged Entity 
Established 
Acquired MLC Life National Australia 
Ltd. Bank 2000 
National Mutual AXA Asia Pacific 
Holdings 1998 
Colonial Ltd. Commonwealth 
Bank 2000 
AMP Ltd. AMP Ltd 
Two of the four were taken over by major Australian banks. A third was 
originally partially acquired by foreign interests. With a re-organization of 
this company in 2000 the emphasis shifted more firmly to an Asia/Pacific 
wealth management and insurance outlook. Whilst the Australian life 
insurance brand name was retained the company is now part of a global 
financial services enterprise. These mergers have contributed to the newly 
emerging structure of the life insurance sector which can be segmented into 
three groups. The main group consists of financial conglomerates which 
represent the bulk of market share and are comprised of the major bank 
owned and foreign owned wealth management institutions. The top ten in 
this group account for 93 per cent of industry assets. All firms with a link to 
a mutual heritage are ranked amongst the top 10 life insurers by assets and 
by premium income (APRA 2004a). Table 8 indicates the industry share of 
the four firms that have a link to the mutual structure. 
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Table 8: Four Mutual Heritage Finns Share of the Australian Life 
Insurance Market 
Year 
1995 
2000101 
2001102 
2002/03 
2003/04 
2004/05 
Percentage of 
Industry Assets 
53.5 
50.5 
68.6 
67.9 
68 
67.8 
Percentage of Total 
Premium Income 
(Australian Business) 
61 
51.1 
59.2 
59.2 
61.1 
60.0 
Source: Collated from APRA Life Office Market Report 2000-2005. 
Table 8 points to an increase in the market share of ex mutuals suggesting 
the new enterprises created have been able to build on the legacy of the 
mutuals to become major players in the Australian life insurance market. 
The second market segment comprises smaller insurers who aspire 
to be 'full service' wealth management institutions but do not have the scale 
advantages of the financial conglomerates (APRA, 2004b, p. 4). They 
account for less than five per cent of industry assets but are numerically the 
largest section of the market. The final group are a small number of 
'boutique' insurers who cater for a specific market niche and are not in 
direct competition with the major players. 
Whilst the life insurance industry has traditionally been fairly highly 
concentrated, the nature of this concentration has changed with the 
expansion of the financial conglomerates. Associated with this has been a 
relative decline in the importance of the life insurance industry within the 
financial sector. Between 1998 and 2003 the life insurance industry share of 
total assets in the financial sector fell from 14 per cent to 10 per cent 
(APRA, 2004b, p. 4). The significance of this shift will have broader 
implications if this trend continues. Traditionally the life insurance sector 
has been an important source of institutional funds which government has 
come to depend upon to provide finance for capital expenditure programs. 
The extent of change within the industry suggests that this may no longer be 
the case in the future. 
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Conclusion 
Mutual organizations formed in the Australian life insurance 
industry in response to the failure of the market to provide a suitable 
resolution to agency problems associated with selling life insurance 
products. 
The deregulation of the Australian financial sector in the last two 
decades initiated a major structural and organisational change within the life 
insurance industry of that country. Up until the 1990s the regulatory 
environment which governed the Australian financial sector contributed to 
the preservation of an industry structure which had dominated the life 
insurance market for the previous 150 years. The process of deregulation in 
reducing barriers to entry into this industry altered the manner in which 
information costs impacted on life insurers. The concurrent advances in 
information processing and marketing of insurance products changed the 
nature of information costs. Together these two factors placed pressure on 
existing organisational structure of the major players within the life 
insurance market. The path to the demutualisation of the major life insurers 
became inevitable as the need for capital to transform their organisational 
structures grew. During the 1990s all mutual life insurers demutualised and 
the newly formed companies moved rapidly to become integrated financial 
service providers. 
However the process of organisational change did not halt at this 
point. The continuance of technologically induced pressures on information 
costs and the process of intermediation, together with the poor performance 
of the newly demutualised insurers sparked further adjustment. 
Demutualised firms struggled to compete in the new market environment. 
The market share of these firms fell both in terms of assets and premium 
income. Measures of profitability pointed not only to a fall in profit but an 
increased volatility in the performance of these .firms. In addition there 
appeared to be no great efficiency gains immediately apparent. Returns on 
Assets and Returns on Equity indicated erratic trends. At the same time 
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demutualised insurers moved rapidly to acquire stakes in related markets. 
The pace and degree of reorganization made them vulnerable takeover 
targets. A further round of restructuring became inevitable as demutualised 
life insurers struggled to compete with the emerging banking 
conglomerates. 
Mergers and takeovers within the Australian industry led to further 
I ) 
structural and· organisational change which resulted in a three tier structure 
in the industry. The industry has become dominated by first tier firms 
represented by the large banking and foreign owned wealth management 
institutions. The information cost model suggests that in the deregulated 
environment further structural adjustment will continue whilst information 
costs differential exist between firms within the industry. The Australian 
experience is in line with overseas trends. A study of the US life insurance 
sector by Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1998) concluded that 
consolidation within the industry would continue as long as life insurers 
lose out to non traditional providers. 
The experience of organisational change within the Australian life 
insurance industry in the last decade illustrates the complex and in some 
cases unforseen impacts regulatory and deregulatory policies have on the 
nature of financial markets. When these policies are implemented in times 
of rapid technological innovation the outcomes are even more involved and 
difficult to predict. The information cost approach provides a useful format 
for understanding and interpreting this complicated process of change. 
Acknowledgements: the author is indebted to the anonymous referees for 
comments and suggestions on earlier verSIOns of this paper. 
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APPENDIX 1 Selected Activities ofDemutualised Insurers 1996-2000 
AMP Ltd 
Listed January 1998 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Colonial Ltd 
Listed 9 January 1997 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
NML Holdings 
Listed 8 October 1996 
1996 
1997 
1998 
acquired UK funds manager 
acquired Australian property trust 
acquired NZ retail bank 
registered AMP Bank in NZ 
acquired UK mutual pension fund 
acquired Australian financial services company 
acquired major Australian general insurer 
created global investment management business 
restructured general insurance business 
introduced new retail products including low interest credit card 
expanded global asset business in Europe 
entered partnership with UK firm to launch new financial services business 
acquired interest in large Asia/Pacific life insurer 
commenced stockbroking division 
entered partnership to sell general insurance in NZ 
entered joint venture to provided industry funds administration business 
completed integration of Australian financial services division 
established life insurance business in China 
consolidated funds management business 
acquired Australian business of major UK insurer 
acquired Hong Kong business of UK insurer 
acquired Australian and NZ business of UK insurer 
acquired 51% share in National Bank of Fiji 
acquired Asian and UK business of US fund manager 
formed life insurance company in Shanghai with Chinese insurer 
introduced new investment product in Australia 
obtained license to operate joint venture life insurance business in Vietnam 
Company delisted after merger with Commonwealth Bank 
expanded range of unit trusts in Australia and NZ 
entered Indonesian life insurance market 
granted life insurance license in Thailand 
opened life insurance branch in China 
acquired three Asian life insurers (Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore) 
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1999 
2000 
acquired interest in Shanghai life insurer 
introduced new superannuation product 
combined group insurance business ofNMLA with other subsidiary insurer 
acquired Singapore life insurer 
acquired balance of shares in Chinese subsidiary life insurer 
Reorganization of parent company, name changed to AXA Asia Pacific Holdings 
Source: Collated from AspectHuntly, http://www.aspectfinancial.com.au. accessed May 
2006 
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Endnotes 
1 The mutual form of organization was based on co-operation and pooling 
of resources. Ownership is derived from membership. Policyholders were 
also owners of the firm's assets however they are unable to trade their 
interest in these assets (RBA, 1999, p.1). 
2 State insurance offices were not covered under the federal act. Only one 
state office applied for registration, that was the Government Insurance 
Office ofN.S.W. in 1988. 
3 Mayer and Smith (1986) examined 30 life insurers that switched to mutual 
ownership, their findings confirm the general hypothesis that mutual 
companies must be efficient to survive in competition with non mutuals. 
4 Following that two leading banks sought to acquire the AMP and Colonial 
(Australian Financial Review April 3- 5 2000). While the merger between 
the National Australia Bank and the AMP was aborted under some 
controversy, that between the Commonwealth Bank and Colonial has gone 
ahead. 
5 Demutualization is defined as the process of changing a mutual 
association into a public company. It is the conversion of members' 
interests into shareholdings. 
6 The Life Insurance Act 1995 introduced more specific reporting 
requirements for life insurers. Much of the information now collected was 
not required before this date, this makes a meaningful comparison with the 
period prior to this point difficult. 
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